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Suppose two types of consumers with skill levels 10 and 20. There is an equal number of consumers of both types. If the social welfare function is utilitarian and no revenue is to be raised, find the optimal allocation under a nonlinear income tax for the utility function U = log(x) –. Contrast this to the optimal allocation if skill was publicly observable.